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Several mission-critical and safety-intensive applications such as space, aerospace, 
nuclear, power, defence, security, banking and financial, and industrial control and auto-
mation incorporate redundancy into their hardware and/or software in order to provide 
guaranteed correct operation in the face of arbitrary function module fault(s)1 (Briere 
and Traverse 1993; Koren and Mani Krishna 2007; Engelmann et  al. 2009; Dubrova 
2013). This is because a non-redundant system might turn out to be a single point-of-
failure when critical faults get manifested (Johnson 1988). In a passive NMR system 
1 The term ‘fault’ may refer to single or multiple faults occurring within the function module which may not cause a 
catastrophic failure of the function module. On the other hand, the term ‘fault’ when used in the context of a func-
tion module, as used in this footnote, may mean a complete function module failure implying that the function module 
outputs are no more reliable. The meaning of the term ‘fault’ therefore has to be carefully interpreted in reference to the 
context of its usage.
Abstract 
N-modular redundancy (NMR) is a generic fault tolerance scheme that is widely used 
in safety–critical circuit/system designs to guarantee the correct operation with 
enhanced reliability. In passive NMR, at least a majority (N + 1)/2 out of N function 
modules is expected to operate correctly at any time, where N is odd. Apart from a 
conventional realization of the NMR system, it would be useful to provide a concur-
rent indication of the system’s health so that an appropriate remedial action may be 
initiated depending upon an application’s safety criticality. In this context, this article 
presents the novel design of a generic NMR system health monitor which features: (i) 
early fault warning logic, that is activated upon the production of a conflicting result by 
even one output of any arbitrary function module, and (ii) error signalling logic, which 
signals an error when the number of faulty function modules unfortunately attains a 
majority and the system outputs may no more be reliable. Two sample implementa-
tions of NMR systems viz. triple modular redundancy and quintuple modular redun-
dancy with the proposed system health monitoring are presented in this work, with 
a 4-bit ALU used for the function modules. The simulations are performed using a 
32/28 nm CMOS process technology.
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constructed using N copies of a function module,2 at least (N + 1)/2 of the N function 
modules, which constitutes a majority, are required to operate correctly in order to guar-
antee reliable system operation. In any NMR system, the outputs of N identical function 
modules are combined using majority voting elements and the voters reflect the correct 
system output through a majority vote. Among the generic NMR systems, triple modu-
lar redundancy (TMR) systems which utilize three identical copies of a function module 
are well-known, popular and highly sought after for the design of safety-intensive appli-
cations (Johnson 1988). However, a TMR system can cope with only a single function 
module fault. Hence in mission-critical space and aerospace systems (Web Reference 1 
2001; Azbug and Larrabee 2002), quintuple modular redundancy (QMR) is also used to 
achieve enhanced reliability. The QMR, which forms a subset of the NMR system, 
employs five identical copies of a function module and could guarantee fail-safe opera-
tion even if any two function modules might fail arbitrarily.
In addition to the successful masking of one (in TMR system) and two (in QMR sys-
tem) function module faults and still providing the correct system output, it would be 
useful to concurrently indicate the NMR system’s health to the external environment so 
that an appropriate remedial action may be initiated to troubleshoot the system in the 
case of any undesirable corruption. In this context, the word-voter (Mitra and McClus-
key 2000), which forms the only relevant work to the best of the author’s knowledge, was 
proposed exclusively to improve the data integrity of TMR system architectures. It is to 
be noted that the concept of word-voter is only limited to the TMR system (Mitra and 
McCluskey 2000), and there are no known mechanisms to ensure data integrity in 
higher-order (passive) NMR systems. The word-voter would signal an error when more 
than one function module becomes faulty in a TMR system. The word-voter would not 
produce any fault indication when just one function module has alone become faulty or 
when multiple function modules develop disjoint faults3 in a TMR system. The error sig-
nalling by the word-voter may either be due to the occurrence of temporary function 
module faults (Lala 1984) in the TMR system from which the system might be able to 
recover or due to the occurrence of permanent function module faults which would 
require a full system shutdown and/or urgent repair.
The primary drawback of the word-voter is that it does not provide advance informa-
tion about fault occurrences which might consequently lead to a sudden, catastrophic 
failure of the TMR system due to sustained operation and the system has to be forcibly 
shut down to perform necessary repair or undertake appropriate remedial action when 
an error is signalled. Given this, supposing fault(s) were detected early during a system’s 
operation, then there exists a possibility to initiate a prompt remedial action thus pre-
empting the likelihood of a potential catastrophic failure through early intervention. 
Motivated by this observation, this article presents a generic and advanced NMR system 
health monitoring mechanism that provides an early fault warning signal when even one 
output of any arbitrary function module in the NMR system produces a conflicting result, 
thus providing the opportunity to observe and perform an early repair/recovery. Note 
that error signalling occurs when a majority of the function modules become faulty.
2 The term ‘function module’ generically refers to any circuit/system in this article.
3 Disjoint faults occurring between the function modules of an NMR system are those which do not affect the actual 
NMR system output(s) due to the absence of any common-mode effect.
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In the rest of this article, ‘‘TMR and QMR—description’’ section describes the fault-
tolerant TMR and QMR schemes along with a portrayal of their system reliabilities, their 
voting elements and their governing equations. In ‘‘Word-voter based TMR and TMR 
incorporating the proposed system health monitor’’ section, an example TMR system 
incorporating the word-voter is illustrated, depicting the scenarios when the error sig-
nalling tends to be correct and incorrect. This is followed by the specific discussion of 
an example TMR system which employs the proposed system health monitoring appa-
ratus and is contrasted with the word-voter functionality. In ‘‘NMR implementation 
with proposed system health monitor’’ section, the realization of a generic NMR system 
with the proposed system health monitoring mechanism is presented, and its operation 
is described for the cases of none, single, and multiple faulty function modules. Next, 
‘‘Example implementation of TMR and QMR without and with the proposed system 
health monitor—results and discussion” section presents the simulation results corre-
sponding to a sample implementation of word-voter based TMR, and TMR and QMR 
systems without and with the proposed system health monitor. The simulation results 
obtained correspond to a typical case PVT specification of a 32/28 nm CMOS technol-
ogy. Finally, the conclusions are given in ‘‘Conclusions’’ section.
TMR and QMR—description
The reliability expressions of simplex (RSimplex), TMR (RTMR) and QMR (RQMR) systems 
are given by (1), (2) and (3), where RM denotes a function module’s reliability, which sig-
nifies the probability of its correct working state. Since identical function modules are 
deployed in NMR (here, TMR and QMR) systems, their reliabilities may also be treated 
as equivalent. Under this assumption and simultaneously assuming perfect voting ele-
ments, the compact system reliability expressions (1), (2) and (3) are deduced.
A plot of different systems reliabilities versus their module reliabilities is depicted by 
Fig. 1. Up till RM is equal to 0.5, the simplex system tends to feature better reliability than 
the TMR or QMR system, but the simplex system does not incorporate any fault toler-
ance. It may be seen that RM = 0.5 represents the crossover point when the reliabilities 
of simplex, TMR and QMR systems become equal. For RM ranging from 0.6 to 0.9, the 
TMR and QMR systems report mean increases in system reliability by 10 and 15.1  % 
compared to the simplex system. In practice, RM tends to be equal to or greater than 0.9. 
In fact, when RM = 0.9, the TMR system exhibits enhanced reliability by 8 % over the 
simplex system and the QMR system reports an improvement in system reliability by 
10.2 % for a similar comparison, despite the TMR and QMR systems being fault-tolerant 
unlike the simplex system which is not fault-tolerant.
The block schematics of TMR and QMR systems are shown in Fig. 2, portraying the 
respective gate-level voters. The majority voters corresponding to TMR (Balasubrama-
nian and Mastorakis 2014; Danilov et al. 2014) and QMR (Balasubramanian and Arabnia 
(1)RSimplex = RM
(2)RTMR = 3R2M− 2R
3
M
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2015) are depicted in Figs. 2a and b. The majority voter corresponding to TMR is realized 
using a single complex gate viz. the AO222 cell, while the majority voter corresponding 
to QMR is realized using two 3-input OR gates, three 3-input NAND gates, and a com-
plex gate viz. the OAI221 cell. In Fig. 2, P, Q and R represent the outputs of function 
modules of the TMR system which are equivalent, while, P, Q, R, S and T denote the 
function module outputs of the QMR system which are also equivalent. In the case of 
TMR, function modules 1, 2 and 3 are used, while function modules 1 to 5 are employed 
in the case of QMR. X and Y represent the respective voter/system outputs of TMR and 
QMR systems. The respective system/voter output equations of TMR and QMR systems 
are given by (4) and (5). Note that (4) and (5) depict all the Boolean majority clauses of 
the function module outputs corresponding to TMR and QMR systems. Figures 2a and 
b synthesize (4) and (5) respectively using standard library cells post logic optimization.
Word‑voter based TMR and TMR incorporating the proposed system health 
monitor
The conventional TMR implementation is different from the word-voter based TMR 
implementation (Mitra and McCluskey 2000) in that the former can handle at most one 
function module fault, while the latter may be able to selectively handle even multiple 
function module faults. An example TMR implementation incorporating the word-
voter (enclosed within the violet rectangle) is shown in Fig.  3 for an illustration, with 
the binary half adder used for the function modules. The ‘matching logic’ that confirms 
whether the outputs of a pair of function modules are equal (signified by binary 1) or not 
(signified by binary 0) is shown highlighted within the pink oval in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3, A1 to A3 and B1 to B3 constitute the function modules’ inputs, while Sum1 
to Sum3 and Cout1 to Cout3 represent the function modules’ outputs. The respective 
primary inputs of the half adders’ viz. A1, A2, A3 and B1, B2, B3 are equivalent. The 
half adders’ corresponding outputs viz. Sum1, Sum2, Sum3 and Cout1, Cout2, Cout3 
(4)X = PQR + PQ + QR + PR
(5)
Y = PQRST + PQRS + PQRT + PQST + PRST + QRST + PQR + PQS

























Fig. 1 Reliability curves of simplex, TMR and QMR systems plotted as a function of their module reliabilities















































Fig. 2 Block diagram of a TMR system and b QMR system along with the voters
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are also equivalent. Assuming that half adders 1 and 2 are operating correctly and half 
adder 3 alone has become faulty, Sum1 = Sum2, and Cout1 = Cout2, and hence W12 
evaluates to 1. However, Sum 1 ≠ Sum3 and Cout1 ≠ Cout3. Also, Sum2 ≠ Sum3 and 
Cout2 ≠  Cout3. Thus, W23  =  W13  =  0. Since W12  =  1, the error output, ErrorWV 
becomes 0, implying that a single faulty function module in the TMR system is success-
fully masked by the word-voter and it also manages to produce the correct system out-
put by satisfying the Boolean majority, i.e. Sum = Sum2 and Cout = Cout2. Notice that 
the word-voter will not produce an error signal if a majority of the function modules in 
the TMR system is maintaining the correct operation.
The word-voter is meant to handle common mode multiple function module faults 
only in the TMR system. Let us now presume that after the application of specific 
inputs, the correct outputs of half adder 2 are Sum2  =  1 and Cout2  =  1. Assuming 
that half adders 1 and 3 have become faulty, let their outputs be assumed as Sum1 = 0, 
Cout1 = 1; and Sum3 = 1, Cout3 = 0. As a result, the internal word-voter outputs viz. 



















Word-voter with error signalling
Matching logic
(Half adders 1, 2)
Fig. 3 An example word-voter based TMR implementation
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module outputs will evaluate to 0. Hence, the error output (ErrorWV) produced by the 
word-voter would be 1, which is correct, indicating that the TMR system is experiencing 
multiple function module faults, thus suggesting a repair is necessary. Since W13 equals 
0, the outputs of half adder 2 viz. Sum2 and Cout2 are reflected as the TMR system out-
puts i.e. Sum = 1 and Cout = 1, which is also correct.
The only situation which cannot be resolved by the word-voter is the scenario when 
a majority of function modules in the TMR system become faulty and agree to produce 
similar incorrect outputs, which would not be signalled as an error because the word-
voter would view this as incorrect outputs produced by just one faulty function module. 
Under the above assumption of the fault-free half adder 2 (i.e. Sum2 = 1 and Cout2 = 1) 
and faulty half adders 1 and 3, let us now assume that the outputs of half adders 1 and 
3 are Sum1 = Sum3 = 0 and Cout1 = Cout3 = 0, instead. Given this, W12 = W23 = 0, 
but W13 = 1 since the outputs of the faulty half adders 1 and 3 match. As a consequence, 
ErrorWV evaluates to 0, indicating no error, which is incorrect. Moreover, since W13 = 1, 
the outputs of half adder 1 (i.e. Sum1 = Cout1 = 0) are selected and forwarded to the 
primary outputs viz. Sum and Cout, which is also incorrect.
When any two function modules become faulty at the same time in the TMR system, 
and if their outputs also match despite being erroneous, then no error may be signalled 
by the word-voter and the word-voter based TMR system output may also be erroneous, 
i.e. the word-voter suffers from the problem of data-dependency. However, any generic 
NMR system would tend to suffer from this limitation as that of the word-voter and this 
is difficult to deal with at the circuit/system level when passive redundancy is consid-
ered. If any two arbitrary function modules become faulty in the TMR system, and pro-
vided their respective outputs do not match, correct system output would be produced 
by the word-voter along with the correct error signalling. However, no advance infor-
mation about any fault occurrence within the TMR system is signalled to the external 
environment by the word-voter. This is likely to be a drawback since it prevents the pos-
sibility for early fault detection and warning and may not help in carrying out any pro-
active system repair if so required.
To compare and contrast the word-voter based TMR with the TMR implementation 
featuring the proposed system health monitor, a sample TMR realization with the pro-
posed system health monitoring logic and the majority voting logic is shown in Fig. 4 
that utilizes the half adder for the function modules similar to that of Fig. 3. The early 
fault warning logic, error signalling logic, and the majority voting logic are clearly high-
lighted in Fig. 4. The early fault warning logic and the error signalling logic constitute the 
proposed system health monitor. In contrast with the word voter, the proposed system 
health monitor provides an early fault warning signal even if a single function module 
output is in disagreement with the rest of its counterparts, and provides an error signal 
when a majority of the function modules become faulty/fail.
Let us now consider three exemplar scenarios (no function module fault, single func-
tion module fault, and multiple function module faults) with respect to Fig. 4 to describe 
the proposed system health monitoring mechanism. Sum1, Sum2 and Sum3 are the 
respective sum outputs of half adders 1, 2 and 3; similarly, Cout1, Cout2 and Cout3 form 
the respective carry outputs of half adders 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 4. EFW is the output of the 
early fault warning logic and ERROR is the output of the error signalling logic. 
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  • No function module fault: Let us assume that half adders 1, 2 and 3 are 
fault-free. Hence the respective outputs of the half adders are equiva-
lent, i.e. Sum1  =  Sum2  =  Sum3 and Cout1  =  Cout2  =  Cout3. Given this, 
NR1 = NR2 = 1/0 and AD1 = AD2 = 0/1 respectively. As a result, NR3 = NR4 = 0, 
which leads to EFW  =  0. Also, XR1 up to XR6 would equate to 1, and hence 
MD1 = MD2 = MD3 = 1, resulting in ERROR = 0. Thus, EFW = ERROR = 0 which 




































Fig. 4 Sample TMR implementation including the proposed system health monitor
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  • Single function module fault: Let half adders 1 and 2 are fault-free, and half adder 3 
is alone faulty. Let Sum1 = Sum2 = Cout1 = Cout2 = 1 and Sum3 = Cout3 = 0. 
Therefore, in the fault warning logic, NR1  =  NR2  =  0; AD1  =  AD2  =  0 and 
NR3 = NR4 = 1, which results in EFW = 1. With regard to the error signalling logic, 
XR1 = XR2 = 1 and XR3 = XR4 = XR5 = XR6 = 0. Thus MD1 = 1, while MD2 and 
MD3 are 0 s. Hence, ERROR = 0. The output of the system health monitor is given 
by EFW = 1 and ERROR = 0, which is indicative of at least one function module 
fault in the TMR system although the system is said to be operationally healthy, i.e. 
the TMR system outputs are correct and reliable. The system outputs are Sum = 1 
and Cout = 1, since the majority of the function modules’ outputs is 1.
  • Multiple function module faults: Assume that half adder 1 is alone fault-free, 
and half adders 2 and 3 have become faulty. Let Sum1 = 1, Cout1 = 0; Sum2 = 1, 
Cout2 = 1; and Sum3 = 0; Cout3 = 1. Therefore, NR1 = NR2 = AD1 = AD2 = 0; 
NR3 = NR4 =  1 and hence EFW =  1. In the error signalling logic, XR1 =  1 and 
XR3 = XR5 = 0 since Sum1 = Sum2 = 1 and Sum3 = 0. Moreover, XR2 = XR6 = 0, 
while XR4 = 1. Consequently, MD1 = MD2 = MD3 = 0 which results in the issu-
ance of an error signal, viz. ERROR =  1. Thus the system health monitor outputs 
are EFW  =  1 and ERROR  =  1, which are correct. The primary system outputs 
evaluate as Sum = 1 and Cout = 1, which is incorrect since the correct system out-
puts should have been Sum = Sum1 = 1 and Cout = Cout1 = 0. This shows that 
when both the fault warning logic and the error signalling logic are activated (i.e. 
EFW = ERROR = 1), the state of the system health monitor outputs indicates that 
the system outputs are not correct/reliable.
NMR implementation with proposed system health monitor
In this section, a generic NMR system implementation (not just limited to TMR as 
that of the word-voter) with the proposed health monitoring setup is described. A par-
tial NMR system implementation comprising N identical function modules with each 
function module producing K outputs is shown in Fig. 5, along with the proposed sys-
tem health monitor highlighted by the blue rectangle. The voting logic that performs a 
majority vote on the function modules’ outputs to generate the system outputs, similar 
to that of Fig. 2, is not shown as part of Fig. 5 as the present focus is on the description 
of the proposed NMR system health monitor. The proposed system health monitor con-
sists of the early fault warning logic shown enclosed within the orange rectangle, and the 
error signalling logic which is shown enclosed within the red rectangle in Fig. 5.
The proposed system health monitor produces two outputs: EFW, corresponding to 
the early fault warning logic; and ERROR, which corresponds to the error signalling 
logic. Let us first discuss the operation of the fault warning logic, followed by a discus-
sion of the error signalling logic.
In Fig. 5, P1 to PK, Q1 to QK and R1 to RK denote the primary system outputs. It can be 
seen that the corresponding outputs of all the function modules (for example, P1, Q1 and 
R1) are given as inputs to both a NOR gate and a AND gate present in the first level of the 
proposed fault warning logic, whose outputs are combined by NOR gates in the second 
level and their output is fed to the final-stage OR gate that produces the early fault warn-
ing output, EFW. In any arbitrary NMR system featuring N × K outputs, K numbers of 
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N-input NOR gates and AND gates in the first level, K numbers of K-input NOR gates 
in the second level, and a final K-input OR gate are required to realize the proposed fault 
warning logic. The gates present at any logic level may be optimally decomposed taking 
into account the fan-in restrictions of a digital cell library.
Since the function module outputs are simultaneously fed to 3-input NOR and AND 
gates present in the first level of the fault warning logic, if these gate inputs are 1, the 
NOR gate will output 0, and the AND gate will output 1. On the contrary, if the gate 
inputs are 0 s, the NOR gate will output 1, and the AND gate will output 0, i.e. the out-
puts of NOR and AND gates are mutually exclusive if the applied inputs are the same. 
In contrast, if the inputs are different, i.e. if one of the inputs is 1 and at least another 
input is 0, both the NOR and AND gates will output 0. As a result the outputs of the 
NOR gates present in the second logic level will be 1, leading to an early warning signal 
issued by the fault warning logic. From the preceding discussions, it may be evident that 
the proposed fault warning logic is highly sensitive and robust since even a single faulty 
output of any function module would be promptly detected by the fault warning logic 














Early fault warning logic
ERROR
Error signalling logic
(Architecture is inputs-dependent, and
utilizes the matching logic)
System health monitor
Fig. 5 Partial illustration of NMR system with the proposed system health monitor
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the system. In fact, the prompt production of a fault warning signal gives an opportunity 
for a human monitor to initiate immediate remedial action depending upon the applica-
tion. It may be noted that this manner of production of an early fault warning signal is 
absent in the word-voter even for the TMR system configuration.
The primary system outputs viz. P1 to PK, Q1 to QK and R1 to RK are also simultane-
ously processed by the error signalling logic to generate the ERROR signal. The archi-
tecture of the error signalling logic is dependent on the number of function modules 
outputs and basically utilizes the matching logic (shown in Fig. 3). The purpose of the 
error signalling logic is to confirm whether or not the respective outputs of a major-
ity group of the function modules match, and if a match is established with respect to 
even a single majority group of the function modules, the output of the error signal-
ling logic viz. ERROR would be asserted low (i.e. binary 0). Otherwise, ERROR would be 
asserted high (i.e. binary 1) indicating that the Boolean majority condition of the func-
tion modules is violated. An NMR system, where a majority M out of N function mod-
ules is expected to operate correctly, would have a total of NCM majority groups, i.e. 
NCM unique combinations of correctly operating function modules.
For illustration, the error signalling logic of a QMR system is depicted in Fig.  6. In 
Fig. 6a, two function modules I and J are considered, whose respective outputs are MI1, 
MI2 and MJ1, MJ2. The corresponding pairs of outputs viz. (MI1, MJ1) and (MI2, MJ2) are given 
as inputs to two 2-input XNOR gates, which produce the output of 1 if MI1 = MJ1 and 
MI2 = MJ2.
The outputs of the XNOR gates are combined by an AND gate, whose output MIJ is 1 
if the two equality conditions (MI1 = MJ1 and MI2 = MJ2) are met, and 0 even if one equal-
ity condition is not met. Figure 6b shows how the matching logic corresponding to the 
3 function modules viz. I, J and K is realized. The matching logic outputs of the pairs of 
function modules considered (i.e. I, J and J, K) viz. MIJ and MJK are combined using an 
AND gate to produce the matching logic output (MIJK) corresponding to the 3 example 
function modules.
Figure 6c shows how the error signalling logic of the QMR system is realized. Since 3 
out of 5 function modules forms a majority in the QMR system and since a majority of 
the function modules are expected to be in correct operation, there are a total of 5C3 (i.e. 
10) combinations reflecting the distinct majority groups of function modules. Although 
groups of 4 or 5 function modules also form a majority with respect to a QMR system, 
nevertheless, they would be implicitly covered by the majority groups comprising just 
3 function modules. The matching logic outputs of the majority groups are combined 
using a NOR gate, whose output is designated as ERROR in Fig. 6c. At least one match-
ing logic output corresponding to a majority group of the function modules has to be 1, 
which would indicate no error. Otherwise, an error signal would be produced convey-
ing that the Boolean majority criterion is violated. The error signalling logic of an NMR 
system would signal an error if a majority of the function modules becomes faulty, i.e. if 
only a minority of the function modules exhibit correct operation. The cause of multiple 
function module failures may be temporary or permanent.
Given that the proposed system health monitor produces two outputs EFW and 
ERROR, it is important to note that the healthy state of the NMR system is indicated by 
EFW = 0 and ERROR = 0. In fact, this combination implies that the NMR system health 
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is perfect. When a majority of the function modules outputs are correct, the NMR sys-
tem health monitor produces EFW = 1 and ERROR = 0. This combination implies that 
the NMR system is healthy whilst suggesting the need for a potential remedial action 
since EFW = 1. EFW = 1 implies that the output(s) of single or multiple function mod-
ules may have become corrupt; however since the Boolean majority condition is upheld, 
ERROR = 0. When a majority of the function modules become faulty and only a minor-
ity of the function modules outputs agree, the NMR system health monitor outputs 
EFW = 1 and ERROR = 1. This is reflective of the critical (unhealthy) state of the system 
and the system outputs may no more be guaranteed to be correct. If the values of EFW 
and ERROR are maintained as 1 over successive operation cycles, then a permanent sys-
tem error is said to have occurred, but if the values of EFW and ERROR tend to change 
over subsequent operating cycles, then it is indicative of a temporary system error. The 
implications of EFW and ERROR outputs in terms of their binary states for an NMR sys-
tem incorporating the proposed system health monitor are succinctly portrayed through 
Table 1.
The provision of two system health monitor signals viz. EFW and ERROR and that 
too for a generic NMR system in contrast with just one ERROR signal of the word-voter 
(and that too only for the TMR system) is more beneficial with regard to suggesting/
taking early pre-emptive action to troubleshoot the system faults in any mission/safety–
critical NMR system, and this is a major contribution of this article.
Example implementation of TMR and QMR without and with the proposed 
system health monitor—results and discussion
A sample implementation of word-voter based TMR, and TMR and QMR systems with-
out and with the proposed system health monitor has been considered, with a 4-bit ALU 
(Web Reference 2 1988) used for the function modules. The ALU comprises 14 primary 
inputs and features 8 primary outputs, and is realized using the elements of a digital 
standard cell library (Synopsys Inc. 2012). The 4-bit ALU consumes 150.45 µm2 of Sili-
con, while the voters corresponding to TMR and QMR systems shown in Figs. 2a and b 
consume 3.3 and 13.47 µm2 of Silicon respectively.
The simulation results viz. power, delay, and area obtained for the sample implemen-
tation of TMR, word-voter based TMR (TMR_WV), TMR with system health monitor 
(TMR_SHM), QMR, and QMR with system health monitor (QMR_SHM) are shown 
in Table 2. Minimum sized gates were used for all the NMR systems realizations, and 
(See figure on previous page.) 
Fig. 6 Error signalling logic of a sample QMR system with 5 identical function modules. a Matching logic 
corresponding to 2 function modules, b matching logic for 3 function modules and c error signalling circuit 
based on the outputs of matching logic of a QMR system
Table 1 Proposed NMR system health monitor outputs and their states interpretation
EFW ERROR NMR system health
0 0 Perfectly healthy (no fault)
0 1 Indeterminate (invalid)
1 0 Healthy (with fault masking)
1 1 Unhealthy (unreliable)
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the associated wire loads were selected automatically. The structural integrity of differ-
ent NMR systems and their associated voters without/with the proposed system health 
monitor were preserved during technology mapping and whilst performing the simu-
lations. This paves the way for a legitimate comparison of the design attributes of dif-
ferent NMR systems being considered in this work. For accurate estimation of the 
average power dissipation through time-based power analysis, the 4-bit ALU used in 
all the redundant implementations were supplied with all possible distinct inputs viz. 
214 (16,384) input vectors. The input vectors additionally serve as inputs for testing and 
faults analysis. All the input vectors were supplied at time intervals of 2.5 ns (400 MHz) 
through test benches. Functional simulations were performed using Synopsys VCS and 
the functionality of different NMR systems were verified. The.vcd files generated were 
subsequently used for accurate average power estimation using Synopsys PrimeTime by 
invoking the time-based power analysis mode. The area and critical path delay metrics 
were also estimated and are given in Table 2. All the system outputs possess fanout-of-4 
drive strength.
To comprehensively comment on the design parameters, a figure-of-merit (FOM) is 
defined as the inverse of the product of power, delay and area (PDAP−1). Since minimi-
zation of power, delay, and area is desirable, a lower PDAP value and thus a higher FOM 
value are desirable, and the calculated FOM values are given in Table 2. Also, the split-
up of average power dissipated by the function modules, voters/word-voter with error 
signalling, and the proposed system health monitor (where applicable) is portrayed in 
Fig. 7.
From Table 2, it can be seen that the conventional TMR and QMR systems feature high 
FOM than the other TMR and QMR system implementations. This is expected because 
the basic TMR and QMR systems feature only the function modules and the majority 
voters, while TMR_WV, TMR_SHM and QMR_SHM incorporate extra error signalling 
logic or the proposed system health monitor. More logic implies more area and conse-
quently more power dissipation, and is found to be the cause for more propagation delay 
as well. Compared to TMR_WV, the proposed TMR_SHM exhibits a 22.6 % reduction 
in FOM; nevertheless, the proposed system health monitor is more advanced, robust, 
and can provide an early fault warning signal compared to the TMR_WV which embeds 
only the error signalling logic. Also, the proposed system health monitor is generic and 
can be tailored to suit any NMR system. In comparison with the basic QMR system, the 
QMR_SHM reports less FOM by 2.7×.
Table 2 Power, delay, area, and FOM of word‑voter based TMR, and various TMR and QMR 
realizations without  and with  the proposed system health monitor, considering a 4‑bit 
ALU for the function modules
System configuration Power (µW) Delay (ns) Area (µm2) FOM × 106
TMR 38.33 0.75 477.79 72.81
TMR_WV 46.06 1.01 605.62 35.49
TMR_SHM 52.30 1.03 675.77 27.47
QMR 69.86 0.82 860.02 20.30
QMR_SHM 106 1.25 1380.51 5.47
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Referring to the chart shown in Fig. 7, it can be seen that the function modules dis-
sipate extra power in the case of TMR_WV, TMR_SHM and QMR_SHM compared to 
those of their traditional TMR and QMR system counterparts. This is because in case 
of the latter, the function modules outputs are solely processed by the majority voters, 
while in the case of the former, the function modules outputs are additionally processed 
by the error signalling logic or the system health monitor and hence extra power is dis-
sipated. Of the total power dissipated by the TMR_SHM, the proportion of power dis-
sipated by the proposed system health monitor is 20.8 %. In the case of QMR_SHM, this 
proportion is found to be 27 %.
In general, fault tolerance and fault detection cannot be achieved without introducing 
redundant and/or extra logic and without involving a trade-off of the design metrics, 
and quite obviously improvising the fault/failure detection and reporting mechanism i.e. 
through a system health monitor as discussed in this work would entail an additional 
trade-off in terms of the design metrics. In mission/safety–critical systems, design met-
rics trade-off does not form an issue since early fault detection and signalling is more 
important to initiate an appropriate remedial action so as to ensure the correct and reli-
able system operation over the scheduled life-time. This is because sudden and cata-
strophic system fault(s) which might have been prevented through an early intervention 
following an early system health indication may lead to an unexpected mission-failure 
or an early aborting of the mission operation which does not augur well for the mission 
success.
Conclusions
This article has presented a novel, generic system health monitor for ASIC-based reali-
zation of mission/safety–critical NMR systems that gives an early fault warning signal 
upon the detection of even a single erroneous output by any function module consti-
tuting the NMR system, and the signalling of an error once the majority of the func-
tion modules in the NMR system become faulty. The provision of a fault warning output 
serves as an early indicator of at least a single fault occurrence within the NMR sys-
tem, thus promptly suggesting the need for a likely corrective course of action depend-
ing upon an application’s safety criticality. Also, the trade-off involved in the provision 
of system health indication vis-à-vis the design metrics has been analysed for example 



























Fig. 7 Split-up of power dissipation of function modules, majority voters/word-voter, and system health 
monitor (if any) corresponding to various TMR and QMR systems
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